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BOOK REVIEW
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE
TRADE. Henry R. Zheng. Connecticut, U.S.A.: Quorum
Books, 1988. Pp. xi, 228. $45.00.
Reviewed by J.S. Moeller
The Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles of
1973,' or the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), and its extension pro-
tocols embody the complex international regime governing permissi-
ble import restrictions for most types of textile products. 2 After a
year of negotiations the MFA was recently amended and extended
throughJuly 31, 1991. U.S. textile producers decried the final result
of these negotiations and described the agreement as "terrible," an
I The Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840 [hereinafter Multifiber Arrangement or MFA]; extended,
Dec. 14, 1977, 29 U.S.T. 2287, T.I.A.S. No. 8939; extended, Dec. 22, 1981, - U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10,323; extended, Jul. 31, 1986, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10,393, GATI COM
TEX/W/183 [hereinafter MFA IV], reprinted in COM TEX/42, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS: THIRTY-THIRD
SUPPLEMENT 7 (1987); H. ZHENG, LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE TRADE
apps. 4-7 (1988). The current regime consists of the basic agreement, MFA, plus minor
adjustments and modifications as provided in the most recent extension protocol, MFA IV.
The participants of the first MFA included Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bra-
zil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, the European Community, Finland, Ghana,
Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal (on behalf of
Macao), Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom (on behalf of Hong Kong), United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Nicaragua,
Spain, Australia, and Norway did not participate in the second MFA, while Bolivia, Czech-
oslovakia, the Dominican Republic, and Indonesia became new signatories. Norway and
the People's Republic of China joined the third MFA, while Bolivia did not participate.
ZHENG, supra, at 7-8.
2 With the most recent extension protocol, the MFA is nearly comprehensive in its
coverage. It now applies to cotton, wool, synthetic fibers, silk blend fibers, and vegetable
fibers if directly competitive with the foregoing and "in which any or all of those fibers in
combination represent either the chief value of the fibers or 50% or more by weight of the
products." MFA IV, supra note 1, paras. 10 & 24(i)-(ii). Thus the overwhelming bulk of
clothing, yarns, and fibers are included. It does not apply to pure silk products. See MFA,
supra note 1, art. 12. Another exception is made for "developing country exports of han-
dloom fabrics of the cottage industry." Id. Nor does the MFA apply to "historically traded
textiles which were internationally traded in commercially significant quantities prior to
1982, such as bags, sacks, carpetbacking, cordage, luggage, mats, mattings and carpets
typically made from fibers such as jute coir, sisal, abaca, maguey and henequen." MFA IV,
supra note 1, para. 24(iii). This last exception has been construed to apply only to the
listed examples and closely analogous products. ZHENG, supra note 1, at 44.
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"absolute failure," and "meaningless" in providing adequate protec-
tion.3 The U.S. government, on the other hand, characterized the
renewed agreement as providing "the maximum possible protection
for American textile workers without sacrificing jobs in our healthy
export industries or overburdening American consumers," '4 and
claimed that the renewed agreement was worth "billions." ' 5 In his
detailed analysis of both the theory and operation of the current
MFA -regime, Zheng suggests a third point of view: that the regime is
by and large a failure, because it legitimizes high textile import barri-
ers. The MFA regime, he argues, stronglyfavors the interests of the
textile producers in large, net textile-importing states (including the
United States), but its operation runs counter to the long term inter-
ests of these states as a whole. Zheng's basic thesis is that the MFA
constitutes a concession by exporting nations to the protectionist
trade policies of more developed states like the United States. 6
The MFA regime, first and foremost, removes international
trade in textiles from the ambit of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).7 It legalizes import practices forbidden under
GATT within the narrow field of textile imports. The GATT agree-
ment rests upon two basic principles: 1) nondiscrimination and 2)
prohibition against quantitative restrictions. Under GAFF, tariffs
rather than import quotas are used to defend domestic markets.8
Consequently, GATT forbids quantitative import restrictions (i.e.,
quotas). Under Article XIX of GATT, however, an importing coun-
try may impose import quotas against a particular product upon a
showing of "serious injury to domestic producers" or threat
thereof.9 In evaluating the seriousness of injury, mere proposed in-
jurious increases are not sufficient. Price differentiation between im-
ports and similar domestically produced goods is not considered.
Furthermore, under Article XIX injurious increases must have been
unforeseen to be a factor in determining "serious injury."' 0 Quotas
under GATT are to be imposed only "to the extent and for such time
3 Ericson & Dearden, Industry Rips New Textile Pact, J. Com. & Com., Aug. 4, 1986, at
Al, col. 1.
4 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 121.
5 Ericson & Dearden, supra note 3, at Al. col. 1.
6 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 9-13.
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GAIT].
8 Under GATT, "no prohibitions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be insti-
tuted or maintained (against imports)... Id., art. XI. Under Article I of GATT, "any
advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncon-
ditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other con-
tracting parties." Id., art. I.
9 Id., art. XIX.
10 ZHENG, supra note I, at 104.
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as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury."' I If initi-
ated, quotas must be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis against all
exporting countries.' 2 Thus, under GATT, if the United States
wished to impose a quota on wool imports against New Zealand, it
would also have to do so against all other nations from which it im-
ports wool, regardless of its desire not to offend other exporting na-
tions, and regardless of whether or not imports from that source
posed any threat to the domestic economy. The MFA regime arose,
Zheng contends, because of the historical tendency of all nations to
be particularly defensive of their domestic textile markets. The un-
usually high degree of political clout wielded by domestic textile in-
terests forced developed states, in particular the United States, to
seek an alternative arrangement under which domestic textile inter-
ests could be placated without disrupting the GATT framework.' 3
The MFA comprises such an arrangement. The MFA regime,
Zheng contends, allows for the imposition of more stringent import
restrictions under a less demanding standard than GATT. The heart
of the MFA is found in Articles 3 and 4 of the agreement. These two
articles are often referred to collectively as the "safeguard" mecha-
nism. 14 Article 4 of the MFA authorizes the negotiation of bilateral
restraint agreements to prevent "real risks of market disruption."' 5
Article 3 further allows the use of unilateral, source-discriminatory
import quotas if "market disruption" occurs. 16 Under the MFA, as-
suming all criteria were met, the United States could, if it wished,
impose an import quota only against textiles of New Zealand origin
while maintaining no barriers against similar imports from other
sources. The MFA further derogates from GAT principles in that it
eliminates the right of exporting countries to obtain compensation
for damage caused by import quotas as authorized by Article XIX,
paragraph 3 of GATT.'7
The MFA provides a lengthy list of factors to consider in evalu-
ating whether "damage" to a, domestic producer is so serious as to
rise to the level of a "market disruption";' 8 what suffices in the end,
however, is left undefined. These factors include turnover, market
II Id. at 106 (quoting GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX, para. 1).
12 Id. at 107.
13 Id. at 2-5.
14 See id. at 27.
15 MFA, supra note 1, art. 4.
16 Id., art. 3, para. 5(i). It should be noted, however, that an importing country must
first "seek consultations" with the exporting country. Id., para. 3. Further, the importing
country may not "decline to accept imports" from the exporting country unless the coun-
tries fail to reach an agreement within sixty days of the date of the request for consulta-
tions. Id., para. 5(i).
17 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 9.
18 MFA, supra note 1, Annex A, para. 1. "The determination of market disruption...
shall be based on the existence of serious damage to domestic producers or actual threat
thereof." Id.
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share of the importer, profits, employment, volume of disruptive and
other imports, investment, production, utilization of capacity, and
productivity.19 The MFA gives little guidance on how to utilize these
factors to determine "market disruption." Standards like "real risk"
and "disruption," Zheng argues, defy efforts at quantification. 20 Ar-
ticle 5 of the MFA suggests only that the agreement should be ad-
ministered "in a flexible and equitable manner."'2 1 The proviso
which requires that "due account" be given to the stage of develop-
ment of the exporting country, the importance of its textile trade to
its economy, its employment situation, the overall balance of trade in
textiles, and the balance of trade in textiles between the two coun-
tries concerned does little to add clarity. 22
The current regime requires that "due consideration" be given
to price and volume of imports. 23 Annex B to the original MFA text
makes plain that the MFA is only concerned with damage caused by
changes in import volume and price.24 As to volume, there must be
a "sharp or substantial increase or imminent increase." 25 Further,
the increase in volume must be "a measurable one and shall not be
determined to exist on the basis of allegation, conjecture or mere
possibility arising, for example, from the existence of production ca-
pacity in the exporting countries." 26 As to price, import prices must
be "substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of compa-
rable quality in the market of the importing country" 2 7 to justify im-
port restrictions. "Substantially below" is ordinarily understood to
mean "quite out of line with the normal prices prevailing on the mar-
ket."'28 However, according to Zheng, even the definitions of appli-
cable MFA standards are frustratingly vague and formless. 29
In practice, Zheng contends, the lack of an adequate, quantifi-
able definition for MFA standards has led to widespread abuse. It
has allowed powerful importing states to simply give whatever mean-
ing they see fit to these standards, thus cloaking their protectionist
impulses with an air of legality. Many developed states, Zheng ar-
gues, simply treat imports with sufficient domestic opposition as in-
herently "disruptive."130 For example, the current U.S. practice is to
presume market disruption and "trigger" quota consultations under
19 Id.
20 See ZHENG, supra note 1, at 27.
21 MFA, supra note I, art. 5.
22 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 22.
23 MFA IV, supra note 1, para. 7.
24 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 20.
25 MFA, supra note 1, Annex A, para. 11(i).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 20-21.
29 See id. at 26-27.
30 See id. at 22-25.
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the MFA if the total growth in imports in a product is more than
thirty percent in the most recent year; or if the ratio of total imports
to domestic production of that product was twenty percent or more,
and imports from that individual supplier account for one percent or
more of total U.S. production of that product. 31 ,.
Other procedural protections are similarly vague and full of
loopholes. For example, Article 3 restrictions are limited in their du-
ration to two years, but no provision blocks an importer from simply
imposing "new" unilateral restrictions at the end of this period,
without an obligation to increase the quota level.3 2 Thus, unlike
GATT, MFA restrictions may be, as a practical matter, of indefinite
duration. 3 3
Zheng points out that the provisions of Article 4 need not be
abused to work disproportionately in favor of developed importing
states. Although Article 4 suggests that such negotiations are proper
only in cases of "real risk" of market disrtiption, the current regime
gives no guidance as to the interpretation of this standard. 34 Its
broad authorization of negotiated quota agreements thrusts the de-
termination of proper quota levels into the political arena.3 5 Eco-
nomically powerful states (usually importers) have more bargaining
leverage due to superior alternatives. The alternative to negotiation,
Zheng points out, is the imposition of unilateral restraints by the im-
porting countries. Powerful importers can afford to refuse to negoti-
ate, impose unilateral restrictions, and then withstand any
retaliation. This disparity of bargaining power has in practice led to
"consultation clauses," wherein the exporter "consents" to the im-
position of unilateral restraints under specified circumstances
favorable to the importer.3 6 Because these agreements are negoti-
ated, the procedural limits (such as they are) of Article 3 do not ap-
ply. 37 Zheng concludes that in practice any difference between
3I Id. at 24. Zheng is highly critical of this practice, primarily on the grounds that it
expressly ignores the many mitigating factors that should be considered in analyzing mar-
ket disruption. He also asserts the "trigger" mechanism has resulted in increased trade
restrictions. Id. at 25.
Is such a "fast and loose" interpretation of the MFA by the executive lawful? In
American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel Group (AAEI-TAG) v.
United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the D.C. Circuit held the question of MFA
implementation nonjusticiable. A good analysis of this case appears at Note, United States
Trade Policy in Textiles and Apparel: Does the Multifiber Arrangement Have a Future?, 19 GEO.
WAsH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 541 (1985). The author of this note agrees with Zheng's conclu-
sion that the U.S. trigger mechanism is nothing more than a blatant protectionist deviation
from MFA principles. See id. at 569.
32 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 30-31.
33 See id,
34 Id. at 32-33.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 35-36.
37 Id. at 36.
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negotiated and unilateral restrictions is of little consequence.38 Both
are effective tools by which strong importing states effectuate protec-
tionist trade policy, at the expense of exporters.
In exchange for this broad licensing of import quotas exporting
states receive little consideration. Annex B of the MFA purports to
impose quantitative limits on permissible quota levels. In a complex
scheme of qualifications and exceptions, the MFA ordinarily bars the
tightening of previously established quota levels and requires that a
"growth rate" of six percent be maintained if restrictions are to be in
place for more than twelve months. 39 Further, the MFA requires
that newly imposed restrictions must allow for a volume not less than
the actual volume during the "twelve month period terminating two
months or, where data are not available, three months preceding the
month" in which quota negotiations begin."0 Finally, if the import-
ing state has imposed restrictions against a number of related types
of textile imports, it has a duty to allow a certain amount of overflow
(or "swing") if some quotas are underused. 41
Zheng contends that even these modest concessions to export-
ing states are ineffective in practice. Each limitation is eaten through
with loopholes and vaguely worded exceptions allowing importers to
once again dictate the rules of the game. The growth rate require-
ment need not be adhered to if there exist "clear grounds" for find-
ing that "market disruption" will recur if the growth rate is
implemented. 42 A lower positive growth rate may then be imposed
after consultation. 43 Developed importers are frequently able to
craft such an argument given the vagueness of the "market disrup-
tion" standard. The United States, for example, has determined that
a permanent state of market disruption is threatened by wool im-
ports and has imposed a one percent growth rate on all wool im-
ports.44 "Swing" provisions are often flatly ignored by developed
importing states by negotiating bilateral agreements with no men-
tion of "swing" rights. 45
Other MFA concessions to exporter states are similarly easy to
circumvent. Paragraph thirteen of the most recent extension proto-
col mandates more favorable quota terms for developing cotton ex-
porters. 46 However, an escape clause allows an importer, in setting
quota limits, to take into account "the degree of vulnerability of the
industrial sectors concerned in the importing country as well as the
38 Id. at 35.
39 MFA, supra note i, Annex B, para. 3.
40 Id., para. 1(a).
41 Id., para. 5.
42 Id., para. 2.
43 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 40.
44 Id. at 41.
45 Id. at 41-42.
46 MFA IV, supra note 1, para. 13.
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importance of cotton textile exports in the economy of the exporting
country concerned."' 4 7 Special consideration is also to be given to
wool exporters. This provision too is subject to an exception which
swallows the rule; such concessions need only be given to countries
"whose economy and textile trade are dependent on the wool sector,
whose textile exports consist almost exclusively of wool textiles and
clothing, and whose volume of textile trade is comparatively small in
the markets of the importing countries."' 48 The consensus is that
only Uruguay may be eligible to take advantage of this provision,
although the United States maintains otherwise. 4 9 Finally, preferen-
tial treatment is to be accorded to "small suppliers, new entrants,
and least developed countries." 50 However, the MFA's failure to
provide definitions for these terms facilitates circumvention.
The vagueness of the applicable standards exacerbates Zheng's
other principal criticism of the MFA regime: its lack of an adequate
enforcement mechanism. There is no authority which can effectively
compel developed importers to adhere to the letter or spirit of the
MFA. The regime is administered under the auspices of the Textile
Surveillance Body (TSB), described by Zheng as an "intergovern-
mental mediation body." Although Zheng lauds the TSB as an effec-
tive and procedurally developed mediation body, he is critical of its
lack of compulsory authority and inability to. impose binding solu-
tions to disputes. Zheng describes the TSB's role in the implementa-
tion of the MFA as "passive." It has no power to interfere with the
terms of an already reached bilateral agreement. The most that the
TSB can do to ensure compliance with the MFA is to lend clarity to
the definitions of the applicable standards and bring pressure to bear
on violators. Even as to this, Zheng criticizes, the TSB has been inef-
fective. The TSB has failed to adhere to a rule-oriented approach,
tolerating plain deviations from the agreement and even from its
own procedural rules. This weakness has been exacerbated by the
TSB's failure to reach a consensus on the definition of "market dis-
ruption" and the indifference of some importing nations to its re-
quests for justifications of import restrictions.5 1
The TSB attempts to resolve disputes in the last instance by is-
suing a recommendation as to the proper application of the MFA to
a given dispute. Unfortunately, Zheng notes, the TSB can only make
recommendations on the basis of a consensus. In practice, it delays
taking any action whatsoever until it perceives no chance that a bilat-
eral solution to a dispute will be worked out. Zheng points out that
with the United States as a de facto permanent member of the TSB, a
47 ld., para. 13(d).
48 Id., para. 14.
49 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 48-49.
50 MFA IV, supra note 1, para. 13.
51 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 68-71.
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consensus decision contrary to the perceived interests of U.S. do-
mestic producers is virtually impossible. Because each member can
veto the issuance of a recommendation, the TSB is, in Zheng's view,
largely useless as an enforcement tool.5 2
Enforcement of TSB rulings depends ultimately on the enforce-
ment procedures available under GATT. GATT Article XXIII allows
a party to GATT to seek permission to suspend the treaty's applica-
tion to another party that nullifies or impairs the former's benefits
under GATT.53 The TSB has the power to make recommendations
as to the proper course of action, with a TSB recommendation prima
facie constituting nullification of a GATF benefit. 54
According to Zheng, Article XXIII of GATT is itself a phantom
remedy. Authority to retaliate has been granted only once in the en-
tire history of GATT, and litigation itself may drag on for a number
of years, at the cost of steadily irritating the more powerful textile
importer.55 The weaknesses of Article XXIII cannot be sidestepped
since under the most recent MFA extension protocol, retaliation
under GATT may not be had until all available mediation measures
under the MFA are exhausted. 56 Because this is often a process of
years, there is tremendous incentive for importers to drag the pro-
ceedings out to the point where the dispute becomes moot. Thus,
no true compulsory sanction exists under the MFA regime as to de-
veloped importing states, because the effectiveness of its rare sanc-
tion ultimately depends upon the relative abilities of the disputants
to retaliate. Such a situation favors the more economically powerful
developed importing states.
While Zheng displays a noticeable antiprotectionist bias, he does
concede that the system has some merit. Noting that the MFA regime
is dependent upon being renewed by protocol, Zheng expresses con-
cern as to the possible consequences for GATT should the MFA sys-
tem collapse. The MFA, he argues, has helped contain the unusually
intense political pressures for import restrictions generated by do-
mestic textile industries and thereby helped to insulate GATT from
them. Zheng views the textile trade as an area of such potential divi-
siveness as to threaten the continued viability of GATT should the
MFA collapse and textiles return to its ambit.57 Such a return would
not affect the level of protectionist pressures, and subsequent import
quotas (illegal under GATT) would undermine the system. Keeping
textile disputes out of the GATF framework has, according to
Zheng, allowed GATT to function in those areas where developed
52 Id.
53 GAIT, supra note 7, art. XXIII.
54 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 80-82.
55 Id. at 85-88.
56 MFA IV, supra note 1, para. 26.
57 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 111-15.
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states have an interest in promoting free trade while at the same time
appeasing protectionist interests at home and maintaining some
semblance of discipline. The MFA regime, Zheng summarizes, is a
pragmatic approach to trade problems in an area in which GATT will
not work.58
Zheng no doubt believes that the characterization of the MFA
regime as an "absolute failure" by U.S. textile interests 59 merits seri-
ous consideration. However, his reason is not that the system does
not act adequately to protect the interests of U.S. domestic produ-
cers. Zheng argues that the MFA regime benefits domestic textile
industries only at a greater bconomic cost to their nations as a
whole. 60 Protectionism, he argues, as embodied by the MFA regime
is the only thing that has allowed continued domestic textile produc-
tion by relatively developed states. This argument echoes the tradi-
tional liberal approach to free-trade. The textile industry is relatively
labor-intensive. It is a " 'take-off' industry in economic moderniza-
tion."'6 ' Labor is comparatively cheap in lesser developed countries,
allowing textiles to be produced at lower cost. Protectionism inter-
feres with the free flow of international trade and harms domestic
consumers by raising the prices of available textile goods and depriv-
ing these consumers of the opportunity to buy more cheaply pro-
duced (and hence lower priced) textiles. The economic costs, in
terms of higher consumer prices, outweigh the economic benefits of
maintaining domestic textile employment. 62 At the same time, pro-
tectionism encourages economically inefficient production and
removes incentives to retool by removing the threat-of competition.
Absent protectionist trade barriers, Zheng contends, capital in devel-
oped countries is more efficiently utilized in less labor intensive,
higher technology industry.63 Zheng further criticizes textile protec-
tionism on the grounds that it damages the foreign exchange ability
of exporting countries, and may damage long term strategic objec-
tives of developed countries because it projects "contempt" for in-
ternational order.64 Developed nations, he concludes, would fare
better in the long-term if the textile industry was permitted to shift
overseas to less developed countries. 65
Zheng ascribes the continued persistence of textile import quo-
tas to the "strong political influence" of the textile industry. 66 He
characterizes the textile industry as an established sector of the econ-
58 Id. at 123-27.
59 See supra text accompanying note 3.
60 ZHENG, supra note 1, at 125.
61 Id. at 9.
62 Id. at 125.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 125-26.
65 Id. at 9-13.
66 Id. at 11.
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omy, with a large population base and a high degree of geographic
concentration. This concentration facilitates the election of protec-
tionist candidates in a representative democracy. He also suggests
that protectionist forces tend to be better funded and more moti-
vated than their opposition, because the impact of adverse legisla-
tion will be more acutely felt by their constituents; they will lose their
jobs or be put out of business if forced to compete internationally. 67
Zheng foresees the probable renewal of the MFA in 1991 and
with it a further proliferation of textile trade restrictions. 68 He
points to both the increasing strength of domestic protectionist lob-
bies in developed states (particularly in the United States), as well as
fragmentation amongst less developed exporting nations as impor-
tant factors in this prediction. 69 Zheng is not without recommenda-
tions as to how to avoid this fate. He urges developing, exporting
states to put aside their differences and unify so as to increase their
bargaining capability within the MFA framework. Otherwise, Zheng
warns, the developed states, with their greater ability to weather a
war of trade retaliation, will continue to dictate the rules of interna-
tional textile trade.70 He further urges developing countries to stand
together and retaliate in a unified fashion against the United States
and other developed importers. 7' Failing such a unification of effort,
Zheng seems to concede that the unbalanced nature of the textile
regime will continue for some time. He sees little prospect for im-
provement in the structure of the MFA itself, noting that each re-
newal protocol has progressively favored the developed states. 72
Implicit in these .recommendations is one for U.S. textile producers:
spend more time considering the formation of an "Organization of
Textile Exporting Countries" and less denouncing the current
system.73
Zheng's work is for the most part a thoughtful and complete
analysis of the operation of the MFA in both theory and practice. My
principal criticism of Zheng's work is that he oversimplifies the multi-
faceted problem of protectionism into a simple matter of economic
pros and cons. Although he states the case for removal of textile
quotas well, he seems to suggest that the long-term solution to the
problem of textile quotas is insidiously simple. Developed countries,
he implies, only need to realize that it is in their long-term economic
interests not to have import restrictions.
Protectionists' principal criticism of international competition in
67 See id.
68 See id. at 123.
69 Id. at 123-24.
70 Id. at 123-27.
71 Id. at 126-27.
72 Id. at 123.
73 For Zheng's recommendations, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 14
INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE TRADE
textiles is that it results in the loss of domesticjobs. Zheng responds
to this criticism solely through economic analysis. He merely reiter-
ates his conclusion that textile import quotas raise consumer textile
prices and thereby cost the aggregate economy more than the eco-
nomic value of the jobs saved. 74 Zheng provides only limited empiri-
cal support for this assertion by citing to a 1984 Federal Trade
Commission report which concluded that a certain class of textile
restrictions had preserved an estimated nine thousand jobs, with
each job saved costing consumers in the aggregate $34,500 per
year. 75 Zheng concludes that import restrictions are therefore eco-
nomically inefficient and necessarily contrary to the long-term inter-
ests of developed states. Are our decision-makers simply in the habit
of making economically irrational decisions? Do political decision-
makers pass protectionist legislation simply to avoid short-term eco-
nomic disruption and political backlash? Is the problem that simple?
Zheng's argument skirts the key issue of whether or not the eco-
nomic damage inflicted on consumers outweighs not just the eco-
nomic benefit of the jobs saved, but whether it also outweighs the
social value of preserving domestic employment. The problem of
protectionism extends beyond cold, aggregate economic analysis.
It is plain, in the United States at least, that the economic impact
of lost jobs is a major motivating factor behind protectionist legisla-
tion. However, when protectionist forces in Congress and the pri-
vate sector decry the loss of domestic jobs, they do not just assess the
net economic impact on the United States as a whole, since unem-
ployment also carries other ramifications. At least within the United
States Congress, there is a perception that the fact of employment
carries inherent social worth beyond its aggregate economic value.
For example, in August of 1986, Congress held a series of debates in
an attempt to override President Reagan's veto of the Textile and
Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985.76 One representative
asked, "[H]ow long are we going to stand by and watch healthy, able-
bodied American workers go on welfare in the name of free
trade[?] ' ' 77 Several others warned that communities and families
74 See id. at 125.
75 Id. (citing Gesse & Lewin, The Mullifibre Arrangement: "Temporary" Protection Run
Amuck, 19 L. & PoLY INT'L Bus. 51, 158 (1987)).
76 H.R. 1562, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1985).
Congress introduced the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985 to stimulate
the recovery of the U.S. textile industry in conformity with the MFA, by restricting imports
of textiles and textile products. See id. Under § 5 of the Act, each year's import levels are
determined by looking to import levels of previous years and deciding whether the im-
ports come from "major" importing countries. To facilitate compliance with § 5, § 6 pro-
vides for an import licensing system requiring a textile importer to present an import
permit upon entry. Id. The Act was geared towards remedying what some of the more
protectionist members of Congress viewed as President Reagan's half-hearted use of the
MFA.
77 132 CONG. REC. S9097 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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would be "wiped out" if textile barriers were not enforced. 78
Other protectionist forces cited nationalism as a justification for
protectionist barriers. Several Congressmen suggested that not
merely jobs were at stake, but "American jobs" were at stake. 79
Others suggested that a strong domestic textile base was necessary
to maintain our international prestige.80 Still others were concerned
about the prospect of a significant shift in textile production to over-
seas concerns. These Congressmen argued that a strong and diversi-
fied domestic textile industry was necessary for national security.
They asked: if faced with a need for prompt military mobilization,
would the United States be able to rely on foreign textile
producers?81
In short, many authorities do not see protectionism in textiles as
a purely economic quandary. Since economic arguments do not ad-
dress the broad spectrum of motivating factors, prescriptive argu-
ments against protectionism would be more effective if not limited to
economic merits alone. Rather, it could be argued that protectionist
legislation is deliberately enacted to serve noneconomic goals of sur-
passing importance, despite the realization that import barriers are
economically inefficient. What may be in a country's long-term eco-
nomic interest may not necessarily equate with its long-term inter-
ests across the spectrum of goals.
Other aspects of Zheng's argument also require critical analysis.
He ascribes the continued viability of protectionism in Western de-
mocracies in part to the geographic concentration of textile laborers.
The final vote to override President Reagan's veto of the Textile and
Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985 was narrowly defeated, gar-
nering the votes of two hundred and seventy-six Congressmen rep-
resenting a wide national cross-section, with only one hundred forty-
nine voting to uphold the veto.82 This cuts against Zheng's assertion
that protectionist forces derive the bulk of their strength from con-
centration and organization. Furthermore, a leading poll on the
topic of textile protectionism, conducted by the Government Re-
search Corporation and Matthew Greenwald and Associates in June
of 1986, showed that seventy-eight percent of the voting population
favored textile trade barriers.83 This evidence would suggest that in
78 E.g., 132 id. at H5494 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986)(statement of Rep. Hendon).
79 Id. at H5520 (statement of Rep. Coble); see also id. at H5513 (statement of Rep.
Biaggi); id. at H5521 (statement of Rep. Rose).
80 See, e.g., id. at H5524 (statement of Rep. Bevill) (foreign nations are "laughing" at
our administration's free trade stance). See also 132 id. at H5483 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1986)(statement of Rep. Ray).
81 See, e.g., 132 id. at H5527 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986)(statement of Rep. Goodling).
82 Id. at H5542.
8s 132 id. at S9097 (daily ed. July 16, 1986); 132 id. at E2751 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Studds).
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the United States textile protectionism is not solely- the result of im-
petus provided by isolated yet organized production concerns.
The absence of import quotas may not necessarily result in
lower prices for domestic textile consumers. There is nothing to
stop foreign producers from setting their textile sales prices at a level
comparable to U.S. prices. Although competition with domestic pro-
ducers would curb this practice, note that under Zheng's prescriptive
model there would be little, if any, competition from U.S. textile con-
cerns. At least one Congressman echoes these sentiments.8 4
While this work is an enlightening look at both the theory and
practice of the MFA, it must be described as largely of scholarly, as
opposed to practical, interest.8 5 In this light, however, LEGAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TEXTILE TRADE is a thoughtful, detailed
and useful analysis of the topic.
8 6
84 See 132 id. at H5520 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986)(statement of Rep. Coble).
85 Although the author does devote substantial space to discussing the practical ap-
plication of the MFA, the work is nonetheless largely analytical in nature. Furthermore, in
light of his basic conclusion that the MFA "system" is largely a "non-system," it is difficult
to see how his analysis, while thought provoking and certainly worth reading, could be of
much use to a practicing attorney.
86 1 have two other formal criticisms of this book. First, it is a physical challenge to
read. This is not so much a comment on Zheng's style as on the quality of the printing.
The book's typesetting is exceptionally poor. The typeface appears to be eight-point,
draft quality, dot-matrix computer printout and, in my opinion, not of professional quality.
Second, prospective purchasers should take note that the book's price is $45. The book
only contains, however, 127 pages of substantive text. An additional 48 pages consist of
footnotes, most of which merely cite to the applicable paragraph of the MFA or GATI'.
Finally, the text of the MFA and all its extensions are set forth in appendices, bringing the
page count up to 228.

